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SHOULD THE UNITED STATES SUPPORT
A REPUBLIC OF KOREA NUCLEAR SUBMARINE
PROGR AM?
Jihoon Yu and Erik French

I

n response to the progress of North Korea toward a functional submarinelaunched ballistic missile (SLBM) and the growing maritime assertiveness of
China, South Korea has expressed a strong interest in acquiring a fleet of nuclearpowered attack submarines (SSNs).1 The United States now faces a difficult
debate: it must choose whether it will oppose or support the Republic of Korea’s
emerging SSN program. This article contributes to this debate, discussing how a
Republic of Korea (ROK) SSN program could result in strategic risks or benefits,
or both, for the United States. The risks of such a policy are readily apparent.
First, the project might undermine already-fragile Sino-allied and ROK-Japan
relations, damaging regional stability. Second, it might create nonproliferation
concerns by expanding the ROK’s latent nuclear capabilities. Third, an ROK SSN
program would involve major opportunity costs; the resources necessary to fund
it inevitably would siphon ROK resources away from investments in other crucial
capabilities.2
Jihoon Yu is a lieutenant commander and a submaDespite these significant risks, however, this
rine officer in the Republic of Korea Navy. He earned
article
argues that the United States should supan MA in national security affairs at the Naval
port and assist its ally if South Korea pursues acPostgraduate School in Monterey, California, and
his PhD in political science at the Maxwell School at quisition of SSNs. First, if the United States works
Syracuse University.
with South Korea, it will have a greater ability to
Erik French is an assistant professor of international
studies at the College at Brockport. He received his ameliorate the aforementioned risks that the proPhD in political science at the Maxwell School.
gram poses. Second, U.S. assistance would bolster
intra-alliance cohesion by reinforcing U.S. com© 2020 by Jihoon Yu and Erik French
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the burden for allied security. Third, support for ROK SSNs would improve the
coercive diplomacy of the United States toward North Korea by enhancing allied
capabilities and signaling allied resolve. Fourth, an SSN fleet would strengthen
the ROK’s power-projection capabilities, improving the allies’ ability to cooperate
on security contingencies beyond the peninsula.
ALLIED REGIONAL INTERESTS
Any discussion of the strategic implications of ROK SSNs for the United States
must begin with an overview of the allies’ shared interests in the Indo-Pacific.
First, the United States and South Korea have an interest in preserving their national security against military aggression. The allies seek to maintain a strong
deterrent and defense against potential aggressors—most notably North Korea.
They aim to dissuade challengers from direct attacks, as well as less-conventional
aggression such as hybrid warfare and state-sponsored terrorism. They also endeavor to remain prepared to defeat aggression should deterrence fail.
Second, the allies are committed to preserving the economic growth and prosperity that has allowed their respective nations to flourish.3 Both recognize that
this prosperity is dependent on the peace and stability of the Korean Peninsula,
which in turn depends on the alliance’s ability to deter North Korea. The allies
also appreciate that their continued economic vitality hinges on regional stability
more broadly; instability in the Indo-Pacific undoubtedly would undercut the
economic interests of both allies. In particular, the ROK economy depends on
sea lines of communication (SLOCs) that run through the South and East China
Seas. If these SLOCs were threatened or interdicted the prosperity of South
Korea would suffer significantly. Regional security and stability are undergirded
by the existing rules-based international order, which provides for freedom of the
seas and the peaceful resolution of international disputes. This order, in turn, is
underpinned by the U.S. hub-and-spoke alliances in the Indo-Pacific, including
the vital U.S.-ROK alliance.
Third, the allies share common values.4 Both understand the importance of
democratic governance and human rights. Similarly, the allies are committed
to the rule of law, both domestically and internationally. This provides both
allies with an additional incentive to resist the aggressive designs of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) on the Korean Peninsula, defending
the ROK’s successful democracy against the authoritarian regime in the north.
These allied interests face significant challenges in the Indo-Pacific. First, the
DPRK’s accelerating nuclear weapons, intercontinental ballistic-missile (ICBM),
and SLBM programs pose a major threat.5 These capabilities greatly increase the
destructive potential of a peninsular war for both South Korea and the United
States. If North Korea is able to use these capabilities to establish a secure nuclear
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol73/iss1/6
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deterrent, it also might become emboldened, undercutting the allied ability to
deter DPRK aggression short of war.6 These capabilities also make it far more
difficult for the allies to defend against North Korea, should deterrence fail.
Although the allies have taken steps to offset the DPRK’s ICBM threat, such as
strengthening the ROK’s Korea Air and Missile Defense systems and deploying
terminal high-altitude area-defense (THAAD) batteries, the DPRK’s development of diesel-electric ballistic-missile submarines (SSBs) and SLBMs threatens
to circumvent these measures.7 North Korea already has tested a Pukkuksong-I
SLBM fired from a Sinpo-B-class SSB successfully and is developing new, morecapable versions of both the Pukkuksong and Sinpo. Estimates suggest that
North Korea will be able to field the Pukkuksong by 2020.8 Once deployed, these
systems will complicate significantly the allies’ ability to prosecute their “4D”
operational concept: detecting, disrupting, destroying, and defending against the
DPRK’s nuclear and missile capabilities.9
The growing maritime assertiveness of the People’s Republic of China (PRC)
poses an additional, major obstacle to both allies’ security and economic interests. China claims special privileges outside its territorial seas, both in its
exclusive economic zone and within its nine-dash line in the South China Sea.
These claims contradict the principle of freedom of the seas.10 China has become
increasingly forceful and provocative in asserting these claims, harassing USS
Decatur in the midst of its freedom-of-navigation exercise near the Spratly Islands on 30 September 2018.11 Furthermore, China steadily has militarized the
South China Sea, developing a host of new military facilities throughout this important waterway.12 Simultaneously, China has expanded its regional antiaccess/
area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities, strengthening its ability to hold maritime traffic at risk.13 These developments could threaten regional stability, the security of
key SLOCs, and the rules-based international order.
Furthermore, the integrity of the U.S.-ROK alliance itself faces challenges
rooted in uncertainty and ROK fears of abandonment. The rhetoric that candidate Donald J. Trump used on the campaign trail in 2016 subsequently created significant concern in South Korea over whether President Trump and the
United States would maintain a strong commitment to the alliance. Subsequent
questions over host-nation support, the funding of THAAD, and U.S. trade pressure only have compounded these concerns.14 Finally, the unilateral decision to
cancel major U.S.-ROK military exercises as part of Washington’s efforts to negotiate denuclearization with Pyongyang has caused substantial alarm in Seoul.
SUBMARINE PROPULSION: AN OVERVIEW
Modern conventional attack submarines (SSKs) rely on diesel-electric propulsion systems rather than nuclear power. SSK propellers are driven via an electric
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2020
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battery, which in turn is connected to and charged by a diesel engine. These
propulsion systems depend on regular refueling for the diesel generator, which
limits SSKs’ range. The system also prevents SSKs from remaining submerged
for extended periods; SSKs must “snorkel” regularly at periscope depth to run
their diesel engines to recharge their batteries. This feature limits their endurance and renders them vulnerable and easy to detect.15 The recent introduction of
air-independent propulsion (AIP) systems to augment the diesel-electric system
has improved the undersea endurance of SSKs, but even the most advanced SSKs
must snorkel to recharge at least once every few weeks.16
Nuclear submarines, in contrast, are propelled by onboard nuclear reactors.
These reactors use enriched uranium to provide the power needed to drive the
submarines’ propellers. This system gives SSNs and nuclear-powered ballisticmissile submarines (SSBNs) virtually unlimited range and endurance, allowing
them to remain at sea or underwater almost indefinitely; neither diesel fuel
nor air are required to propel these boats. The only limitation on the range and
endurance of an SSN is food for the crew.17 Nuclear reactors also generate more
power, supporting a faster and larger boat capable of carrying more extensive
weaponry and sensors.18 This added endurance, range, speed, and equipment
comes at a price, however. SSNs are noisier and less maneuverable than many
modern SSKs. The reactors also require enriched uranium as fuel, creating proliferation concerns. Indeed, many SSNs use highly enriched uranium (HEU), which
is over 20 percent uranium-235 (U-235) and can be used to provide the fissile
material for a nuclear weapon.
Development and subsequent operation of the SSN are technologically challenging and financially costly endeavors that only a few maritime powers have
mastered. Presently, the United States, Russia, China, France, the United Kingdom, and India are the only states that operate SSNs. Brazil also is developing
its own SSN, with assistance from France.19 The significant technological and
financial hurdles to acquiring an SSN suggest that the club of states operating
these boats will remain relatively small for the foreseeable future.
The United States fields a sizable fleet of SSNs; indeed, the U.S. submarine
fleet is exclusively nuclear powered. The Submarine Force Pacific under U.S.
Pacific Fleet operates thirty-one SSNs.20 As highlighted in table 1, these comprise
twenty-four of the older but formidable Los Angeles–class SSNs and seven of the
newer and more powerful Virginia- and Seawolf-class SSNs. They are based in
Guam, in Hawaii, and along the West Coast.
North Korea possesses a range of diesel-powered submarines (see table 1).
While many of these SSKs are antiquated and small, they can be used to lethal
effect, as was demonstrated in 2010 with the sinking of the ROK ship Cheonan.
While North Korea has taken steps to develop diesel-powered SSBs capable of
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol73/iss1/6
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TABLE 1
REGIONAL SSKs, SSXs, SSNs, AND SSBs
DPRK Submarines

PRC Submarines

ROK Submarines

USINDOPACOM
Submarines

10 Yugo class (midget sub)

12 Song class (SSK)

9 Chang Bogo class (SSK)

24 Los Angeles class (SSN)

5 Yono class (midget sub)

13 Yuan class (SSK)

9 Son Won-il class (SSK)

		4 Virginia class (SSN)

40 Sang-o class (SSK)

12 Kilo class (SSK)

1 Jangbogo III class SSK/
SSX (8 more planned)

		3 Seawolf class (SSN)

20 Romeo class (SSK)

13 Ming class (SSK)

		2 Sinpo class (SSB)

		3 Han class (SSN)
		2 Shang I class (SSN)
		4 Shang II class (SSN)

Notes: DPRK = Democratic People’s Republic of Korea; PRC = People’s Republic of China; ROK = Republic of Korea; SSB = diesel-electric ballistic-missile
submarine; SSK = conventional attack submarine; SSN = nuclear-powered attack submarine; USINDOPACOM = U.S. Indo-Pacific Command.

launching nuclear missiles, it has not made any noticeable progress toward a
nuclear-powered submarine.
During the Cold War, South Korea primarily fielded “midget submarines”;
the Korean attack submarine (KSS) program began the process of modernizing
the submarine fleet in 1989.21 As displayed in table 1, South Korea currently possesses only conventional diesel-electric SSKs. It operates nine Type 209 (Chang
Bogo–class, KSS-1) and nine Type 214 (Son Won-il–class, KSS-2) SSKs. It also is
developing nine new three-thousand-ton SSX indigenous (Jangbogo III–class,
KSS-3) diesel-electric submarines, the first of which deployed in 2018.
ROK president Moon Jae-in repeatedly has expressed an interest in developing
SSNs.22 Many current and former ROK government and military officials claim
that ROK SSNs would dramatically improve the ROK’s ability to both deter and
defeat the DPRK’s emerging SLBM capability and to secure the maritime commons. In the past the United States has been unwilling to transfer the sensitive
technology necessary for nuclear naval propulsion to South Korea, but the Moon
administration’s renewed interest in this technology should spark a new debate
in the United States on the merits of assisting South Korea in developing its own
SSNs.23
THE RISKS POSED BY AN ROK SSN PROGRAM
Sino-Allied Relations
An ROK SSN program could create a number of significant strategic challenges
for the United States. First and foremost, it might damage already fragile Sinoallied relations. The logic of the security dilemma suggests that if South Korea
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2020
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strengthens its military capabilities, even for defensive purposes, nearby states
such as China may see these improvements as designed to undermine their security.24 Furthermore, China increasingly views the U.S. alliance system in the
Indo-Pacific in adversarial terms and has responded poorly to previous advances
in allied military capabilities.25 China likely would see an ROK SSN fleet as part
of a broader effort by the United States and its allies to contain growing Chinese power. Worse still, it might interpret this program as a deliberate attempt
to degrade the PRC’s second-strike nuclear capability. China fields a relatively
small—and therefore vulnerable—nuclear arsenal and its SSBNs are not particularly capable or stealthy.26 In theory, new ROK SSNs in the region could be used
in conjunction with U.S. capabilities to hold PRC SSBNs at risk.
Tensions between the allies and China are mounting already. In 2018, the
United States disinvited China from the annual Rim of the Pacific naval exercises, employed sanctions against the PRC’s agency for military procurement for
purchasing Russian weaponry, and imposed several significant tariffs on PRC
exports.27 China, meanwhile, refused to allow a USN vessel to dock in Hong
Kong, canceled several high-level military talks with U.S. officials, and amplified
its challenges to U.S. freedom-of-navigation operations in the South China Sea.28
ROK-PRC ties also have been on the decline following a significant diplomatic
spat over the ROK’s purchase of THAAD batteries in 2016 and 2017. An ROK
SSN program might only compound further the growing hostility between the
allies and China.
Growing Sino-allied tensions could create several challenges. First, it could
lead China to expand and enhance its undersea arsenal further.29 This could trigger an unnecessary arms competition and spiraling tensions that would destabilize the region and leave all parties worse off.30 The character of SSNs may make
them particularly apt to provoke arms races. A number of strategic theorists
have pointed out that offensive capabilities—those assets that are uniquely well
suited for offensive operations—are the most likely to create insecurity among
neighboring states.31 SSNs’ virtually unlimited range greatly enhances the deploying states’ ability to project power, and their stealth and endurance make them
difficult to defend against; this makes SSNs particularly effective for offensive
naval operations.
History is replete with examples of problematic naval arms races. The German
decision to acquire a large fleet in the early twentieth century triggered a major
naval arms race with the United Kingdom in the lead-up to World War I.32 The
U.K. decision to develop a dreadnought—a large, advanced warship with only
heavy guns—acted as a critical catalyst for the escalation of this arms race; not
long after Britain introduced this platform, the Anglo-German arms race intensified further, with both sides acquiring many new capital ships.33 Around the same
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol73/iss1/6
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time, Brazil’s purchase of several British dreadnoughts touched off a local arms
race with the Argentine and Chilean navies.
The Indo-Pacific itself already may be in the midst of a nascent submarine
arms race, with various regional countries acquiring new attack submarines. In
the aftermath of the 1995–96 Taiwan Strait crisis, China rapidly began acquiring
a larger fleet of SSNs as part of an A2/AD approach to challenge U.S. ability to
operate in the region.34 These acquisitions and fear of Chinese intentions in turn
provoked a broader regional undersea race, with a number of states enhancing
their undersea capabilities qualitatively, quantitatively, or both.35 These steps
raised tensions further, and inspired additional states to seek their own SSKs, often from China.36 As table 2 demonstrates, states across the region are acquiring
more-powerful undersea fleets. Singapore’s defense ministry recently highlighted
that the number of submarines in the western Pacific may rise from 200 to 250
by 2025.37
Setbacks in Sino-allied relations could create other challenges. Rather than
TABLE 2
developing new antisubmarine warfare (ASW) or subAN INDO-PACIFIC UNDERSEA
surface capabilities, China might retaliate with economic
ARMS RACE?
coercion against South Korea. The PRC’s recent reaction
Planned and Recently Completed
to U.S.-ROK cooperation on THAAD is illustrative of this
SSK Acquisitions in the Indo-Pacific
risk. China accused the allies of developing capabilities that
India
24
would threaten strategic stability by undermining the PRC’s
Taiwan
8
second-strike capability. Following the ROK’s decision to
6
Australia
acquire the system, China issued a formal diplomatic protest and suspended high-level security dialogues. It also deVietnam
6
ployed its own long-range radar systems to Inner Mongolia
Indonesia
5
in a thinly veiled tit-for-tat maneuver.38 Just as problemThailand
3
atically, China initiated a campaign of economic coercion
Singapore
2
targeting South Korea. Korean pop music events in China
Bangladesh
2
were canceled, several Korean television shows were taken
off the air, and PRC regulators cut off Korean video game
Philippines
2
manufacturers from the Chinese market.39 China also proNote: SSK = conventional attack submarine.
hibited travel agencies from offering package tours to South
Sources: Groll and De Luce, “China Is Fueling a
Submarine Arms Race”; ”Thailand Approves $393Korea, which cut Chinese tourism to South Korea by 20
Mln Purchase of Chinese Submarines,” Reuters,
40
24 April 2017, in.reuters.com/; Ridzwan Rahmat,
percent.
The Korean firm Lotte was targeted by PRC gov“TKMS Begins Work on Singapore’s Third and
Fourth Type 218SG Submarines,” Jane’s 360, 16
ernment investigations, and the bulk of its stores in China
January 2018, www.janes.com/; Marhalim Abas,
“Fighters, Submarines on Philippines Shopping
were shut down “for safety violations.”41 Given the potential
List,” Aerospace Daily & Defense Report, 22 June
2018, aviationweek.com/; “Bangladesh’s First 2
for China to see ROK SSNs as a threat to its SSBNs, it is posSubmarines Commissioned,” Daily Star, 12 March
2017, www.thedailystar.net/; Franz-Stefan Gady,
sible that China might respond in a similar fashion should
“Taiwan’s Indigenous Submarine to Be Based on
European Design,” The Diplomat, 26 September
2018, thediplomat.com/.
South Korea develop this capability.
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China also might respond to this system by threatening key U.S. interests
across the Indo-Pacific. For instance, it could relax further its implementation
of sanctions against North Korea. This would undercut U.S. (and ROK) attempts
to compel North Korea to denuclearize. Alternatively, China might intensify its
militarization of the South China Sea. It could ramp up its interference with U.S.
freedom-of-navigation operations and surveillance flights and deploy new capabilities to its expanding network of military facilities throughout the disputed
waterway. This would undercut the allies’ efforts to maintain free and open access to the South China Sea.
U.S.-ROK-Japan Trilateral Cooperation
An ROK SSN program also might threaten delicate ROK-Japan ties, undercutting
recent U.S.-led trilateral cooperation. Relations between Japan and South Korea
have been beset by numerous challenges, including a territorial dispute over the
Liancourt Rocks (known as Dokdo in Korea and Takeshima in Japan) and contention related to Japan’s imperial history.42 Given these tensions, Japan might see
an ROK SSN program as a threat to its own maritime security. In particular, Japan
could grow concerned that South Korea might deploy its SSNs to assert control
more actively over the Liancourt Rocks.
ROK-Japan relations already are relatively poor. Despite a recent bilateral
agreement between Japan and South Korea over compensations for former “comfort women” in Korea—women who were forced into sexual slavery for the Imperial Japanese Army during the Second World War—this issue has continued
to disrupt positive relations between the two states.43 Similarly, South Korea and
Japan have become locked in a dispute over whether Japanese firms should be
compelled to provide compensation for forced labor during the country’s colonial rule over Korea.44 Overall, the publics in both countries have largely negative perceptions of one another; a Genron-NPO survey found that 48.6 percent
of Japanese and 56.1 percent of South Koreans had negative impressions of the
other state in 2017.45 Japanese fears over an ROK SSN program might serve to
exacerbate bilateral tensions further.
Damaged relations between South Korea and Japan could undercut the significant U.S. interest in stronger U.S.-ROK-Japan trilateral cooperation. The United
States long has sought to strengthen coordination between its two most important allies in the Indo-Pacific despite their historical animosity. Trilateral coordination improves the allies’ ability to pursue key common objectives, including
protecting shared SLOCs and the maritime commons, confronting the DPRK’s
growing nuclear capabilities, and maintaining a stable regional balance of power.
The 2016 General Security of Military Information Agreement, which improved
intelligence and information sharing among the three militaries, represented
a major improvement in trilateral cooperation. Nevertheless, progress toward
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol73/iss1/6
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TABLE 3
SSN FUEL ENRICHMENT LEVELS BY COUNTRY
Country

SSN Fuel: Level of Enrichment (% U-235)

trilateral cooperation remains tenuous at best and could be disrupted
by an ROK SSN program.

Nuclear Proliferation Concerns
A nuclear propulsion system could
United Kingdom
HEU (93)
improve the ROK’s latent nuclear
Russiaa
HEU (40)
capabilities, undermining U.S.
India
HEU (40)
nonproliferation objectives. Joseph
Brazilb
LEU (18–19)
Pilat defines nuclear latency as “the
LEU (5–7.5)
France
possession of many or all of the
technologies, facilities, materials,
PRC
LEU (3–5)
expertise (including tacit knowlNotes:
edge), resources and other capabiliHEU = highly enriched uranium; LEU = low-enriched uranium; PRC = People’s Republic
of China; SSN = nuclear-powered attack submarine.
ties necessary for the development
a. Third- and fourth-generation SSNs.
b. Experimental reactor.
of nuclear weapons, without full
Source: George Moore, Cervando Banuelos, and Thomas Gray, Replacing Highly Enriched
Uranium in Naval Reactors (Washington, DC: Nuclear Threat Initiative, March 2016).
operational weaponization.” 46 If
South Korea were to fuel SSNs independently, its latent nuclear capabilities would be enhanced in several ways. SSN
reactors require enriched uranium. Uranium enrichment, currently restricted
under the U.S. Atomic Energy Act, section 123 (also known as the 123 agreement), is a key prerequisite for a functional nuclear program. Still more problematically, the most powerful SSN reactors use HEU containing over 20 percent
U-235. As table 3 emphasizes, many of the leading global navies rely on SSNs
fueled by HEU. HEU is fissile material—often 90 percent or more U-235—that
can be used to develop a nuclear weapon. That being the case, ROK production
of HEU would strengthen substantially the country’s latent ability to produce
nuclear weaponry and would pose serious nonproliferation challenges.
SSN reactors also would produce uranium waste that would need a disposal plan. Some in South Korea have argued that reprocessing (including pyroprocessing) is required to manage the ROK’s dwindling storage space for spent
fuel. As with uranium enrichment, reprocessing—a process that can be used
to produce plutonium—can serve as the basis for a nuclear weapons program.
Overall, fueling and operating SSN naval reactors would bring South Korea closer
to mastering the full nuclear fuel cycle, which would advance its latent nuclear
capabilities.
Other states have used naval reactor programs for this purpose. In the 1970s,
for instance, Brazil used work on its naval reactor as part of a broader push to
conquer the nuclear fuel cycle and potentially develop a nuclear weapon.47 Iran
similarly has threatened to use work on a naval reactor to advance its latent
nuclear capability. In 2012, during negotiations over the Iranian nuclear accord,
United States

HEU (93–97.5)
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Iran announced it would be developing an SSN; this constituted an attempt to
strengthen its bargaining position by threatening to advance its latent nuclear
potential.48 Similarly, in 2017, Iran resumed its work on this naval reactor to put
pressure on the new U.S. administration.49
Opportunity Costs
An ROK SSN program also would bring with it sizable opportunity costs. The
ROK’s planned budget for 2019 was roughly $415 billion and included around
forty-two billion dollars in defense spending—an 8.2 percent increase year over
year. Yet although ROK military expenditure is increasing, it is far from unlimited. While an SSN fleet would provide a dramatic and powerful new capability
for the ROK Navy, the funds required for the project would have to be diverted
away from other programs that could advance allied interests. More specifically,
this qualitative improvement could come at the expense of quantitative increases
to the ROK naval arsenal.50 Alternatively, this funding could be used for missile
defenses, air forces, or ground forces, or it could be invested in the ROK economy.
A simple comparison illustrates the opportunity costs of an ROK SSN. Table
4 highlights some of the potential alternative systems and equipment in which
South Korea could invest to strengthen its ability to deter and defeat North Korea and better secure the maritime commons. If we assume that an ROK SSN
would have a per-unit cost similar to that of Virginia-class SSNs—around $2.5
billion each—this would mean that for the price of a single SSN South Korea almost could acquire three of its most advanced guided-missile destroyers (of the
Sejong the Great, KDX-III class) to augment its growing blue-water capabilities.
TABLE 4
THE COMPARATIVE COST OF SSNs
Name of Equipment/Platform

Type of Equipment/Platform

Cost per Unit (U.S.$)

Virginia class

Nuclear attack submarine

$2.5 billion

Sejong the Great class

Guided-missile destroyer

$923 million

Jangbogo III class

Diesel-electric attack submarine

$900 million

THAAD battery

Ballistic-missile defense system

$800 million

Son Won-il class

Diesel-electric attack submarine

$300 million

Dokdo class

Amphibious assault ship

$288 million

P-8 Poseidon

Antisubmarine warfare aircraft

$256.5 million

Note: THAAD = terminal high-altitude area defense.
Sources: Keck and Sokolski, “South Korea Is About to Make a $7 Billion Nuclear Submarine Blunder”; Andrew Clark, “Australia’s Barracuda Submarines: Too Expensive and Too Little, Too Late,” Australia Financial Review, 1 June 2017, www.afr.com/; “KDX-III Sejong Destroyer,” Global Security,
www.globalsecurity.org/; Franz Stefan-Gady, “South Korea to Develop Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile,” The Diplomat, 2 June 2016, thediplomat
.com/; Amanda Macias, “North Korea Will Now Have America’s Most Advanced Missile System in Its Backyard,” Business Insider, 9 July 2016, www
.businessinsider.com/; “History of Patrol Squadron Eight: Continuing a Legacy of Excellence,” United States Navy, 17 March 2014, www.public.navy.mil/.
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Alternatively, to improve its ASW capabilities, South Korea could use this money
to increase the quantity of its undersea assets vastly. For the price of a single SSN
it almost could acquire three new advanced Jangbogo III–class SSKs or as many as
eight smaller Son Won-il–class SSKs. South Korea also could upgrade its missiledefense capabilities significantly, adding three new THAAD missile defense batteries for around the same price. The allies could benefit significantly from the
addition of any of these other capabilities.
The preceding section emphasizes that an ROK SSN program may create some
significant challenges for key U.S. interests in the Indo-Pacific. Several of these
hazards might make the United States think twice about supporting an ROK SSN
program. Nonetheless, U.S. coordination with South Korea can help offset some
of those risks. More importantly, as will be highlighted below, U.S. assistance with
an ROK SSN program could benefit both countries’ interests in several important
ways.
THE CASE FOR U.S. SUPPORT
Managing Risks
If the United States provides support and assistance to South Korea in developing an SSN fleet, it is likely to have greater influence over how South Korea pursues the program. In particular, the United States would be better positioned to
dampen potential ROK-Japan tensions and address nonproliferation challenges.
In contrast, if the United States refrains from supporting an ROK SSN program it
sacrifices any leverage it might be able to exercise over how South Korea designs
or uses its SSN fleet.
U.S. participation in an ROK SSN program could improve America’s ability to
prevent unnecessary tensions between Japan and South Korea. First, as Japan’s
closest ally, the United States is well positioned to reassure Japan that U.S.-ROK
cooperation on an SSN program is not intended to threaten Japan’s maritime security. Indeed, given the substantial overlap between Japanese and ROK interests
in deterring North Korea and preserving a secure, stable Indo-Pacific, Washington could work to convince Tokyo that Japan stands to gain from enhanced ROK
naval capabilities. Second, the United States could leverage its support for the
ROK’s SSN program to encourage South Korea to amplify its maritime cooperation with Japan. This could include expanding existing trilateral naval exchanges,
maritime exercises, and intelligence-sharing arrangements. If the United States
chooses to remain uninvolved in the ROK’s SSN development, however, Japan
likely will see the program as more threatening and South Korea may be less willing to work more closely with Japan on maritime security.
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U.S. leverage also should improve Washington’s ability to mitigate nonproliferation concerns created by an ROK SSN program. In particular, the United
States could work to convince South Korea to use low-enriched uranium (LEU)
rather than HEU. LEU is not fissile and would be more difficult to convert into
a nuclear weapon, so it would pose far fewer proliferation concerns. The United
States also could offer to provide South Korea with the fuel necessary for an
LEU SSN, removing the need for South Korea to enrich its own fuel. This would
dampen further the effect of an SSN program on the ROK’s latent nuclear capabilities. However, if the United States withholds support for the ROK’s SSN
development it may find it more difficult to persuade South Korea to address U.S.
nonproliferation concerns.
Alliance Cohesion
A U.S.-assisted ROK SSN program would have substantial ramifications for the
strength of the U.S.-ROK alliance relationship. First, support would serve as a
clear and credible signal of U.S. commitment to the alliance, reducing the ROK’s
fear of abandonment.51 Public affirmations of alliance commitment are relatively
“cheap” and therefore not particularly credible unless accompanied by costly
signals that uncommitted states would be unwilling to issue.52 Since U.S. support
for an ROK SSN program would involve transferring sensitive technology and
expertise, it would serve as a credible signal of U.S. commitment to its alliance
with the ROK. Second, the transfer of sensitive technology and expertise would
help highlight the enduring benefits of the alliance for South Korea. By reducing
the ROK’s fears of abandonment and increasing the direct benefits of its partnership with the United States, assistance would shore up the strength of this critical
alliance.
Conversely, a U.S. decision to oppose an ROK SSN program likely would cause
significant damage to the U.S.-ROK alliance. Several ongoing trends have weakened this important alliance already. President Donald Trump’s transactional
perspective on U.S. alliance relationships, expressed both on the campaign trail
and while in office, has caused some concern in South Korea over the strength
of the U.S. commitment to ROK security.53 The recent decision to cancel ULCHI
FREEDOM GUARDIAN and other major military exercises with South Korea to
accommodate DPRK demands has contributed further to the ROK’s fears of
abandonment. Alarmingly, polling data indicate that ROK citizens increasingly
believe that the United States does not take the ROK’s national interests into
consideration when determining policy.54 Were U.S. policy makers to oppose
the ROK’s SSN program actively, this likely would reinforce these growing fears
of abandonment in South Korea. This in turn might lead South Korea to hedge
against abandonment by jumping on the PRC bandwagon, appeasing North
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Korea, or balancing against these threats by initiating a nuclear-weapons program. None of these possible courses would advance U.S. national interests.
The United States has used the transfer of military technology to reinforce its
alliances and security partnerships successfully in the past. U.S.-U.K. cooperation
on naval nuclear propulsion in the late 1950s provides a telling example. The
U.S.-U.K. dispute during the divisive Suez crisis in 1956 left President Dwight D.
Eisenhower looking for a way to reinforce the shaken alliance with the United
Kingdom. At the same time, Eisenhower hoped to build up British military capabilities so that the United Kingdom, and NATO more broadly, could assume
more responsibility for the growing burden of deterring an increasingly powerful Soviet Union. To accomplish these objectives, Eisenhower sought to transfer
naval nuclear technology to assist the United Kingdom in developing its own
SSN.55 Under the leadership of Admiral Hyman Rickover, USN, and Admiral
Louis Mountbatten, RN, the allies began sharing technological knowledge about
naval nuclear propulsion to strengthen their alliance and reinforce the United
Kingdom’s independent capabilities.56
Although U.S. domestic politics complicated this process, in 1958 the allies
succeeded in creating the U.S.-U.K. Mutual Defense Agreement, which authorized the transfer of nuclear propulsion technology between the allies. This included the sale of an American-made Westinghouse S5W naval nuclear reactor
to the United Kingdom and the training of British submariners in the United
States. This allowed the United Kingdom to develop its first SSN—HMS Dreadnought—powered by the S5W. It also facilitated the development of the United
Kingdom’s first fully indigenous SSNs, the Valiant class, powered by the “son of
S5W,” a Rolls-Royce pressurized-water reactor.57 This cooperation had a major
impact on the strength and cohesion of the U.S.-U.K. alliance. On completion
of HMS Dreadnought, U.K. leaders praised the U.S. contribution to British naval
capabilities.58 Two leading RN officers later remarked that the “UK’s debt to the
U.S. Navy, and to Admiral Rickover in particular, is incalculable.”59
Just as importantly, U.S. decisions to withhold capabilities from allies have
undermined alliance cohesion in the past. In the 1970s, for instance, President
Jimmy Carter’s decision to block the sale of the F-16 fighter jet to South Korea
further compounded the ROK’s concerns about abandonment amid an intraallied dispute over the ROK’s human rights practices.60 Similarly, Japan’s attempt
to acquire the F-22 fighter jet from the United States late in the first decade of the
twenty-first century came to be seen as a litmus test of U.S. commitment to the
alliance.61 The reluctance to transfer the F-22, because of the sensitive technology involved, was framed in Japan as a sign that the United States was less than
fully committed to Japan’s defense. This contributed to Japan’s emerging concerns
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about abandonment amid the American financial crisis and its decision to delist
North Korea as a state sponsor of terrorism.
Coercive Diplomacy with North Korea
An SSN program also could strengthen the allies’ coercive diplomacy toward
North Korea. Coercive diplomacy here refers to the allies’ efforts to convince
North Korea to comply with their will through threats to use force.62 The United
States and South Korea use coercive diplomacy to deter DPRK aggression and
compel an end to the DPRK’s advancing nuclear and missile programs, including
its SLBM program. An ROK SSN program could assist with this task by serving
as a signal of resolve, strengthening deterrence by denial, and providing a useful
asset for gunboat diplomacy.
An SSN program could be employed as a powerful signal to North Korea of
the allies’ resolve to secure the Korean littoral and prevent the continued advancement of the DPRK’s nuclear and missile capabilities. SSNs are expensive,
controversial, and technically challenging platforms, given the nuclear technology required for their development and operation. The ROK’s willingness to
bear the costs of acquiring and operating this platform would serve as a credible
signal reinforcing the ROK’s unwillingness to tolerate the DPRK’s illicit weapons
programs. Furthermore, as mentioned above, support by the United States would
serve as a credible signal of its resolve to defend South Korea against emerging
challenges. By sinking funds into their defenses that irresolute states would be
unwilling to commit, the allies would reduce the chances that North Korea will
underestimate their commitment to their defense.63
ROK SSNs also could help dissuade North Korea from developing, deploying, or using SLBMs and SSBs through the threat of denial.64 Current ROK ASW
capabilities are relatively limited, despite the recent acquisition of new ASW
helicopters.65 An SSN fleet would provide a strengthened ASW capability, improving the ability of the ROK fleet to track and eliminate DPRK submarines. In
peacetime, SSNs could rely on their exceptional endurance (see table 5) to loiter
for extended periods concealed beneath the surface at a safe distance from DPRK
submarine bases such as Mayang Do to monitor SSB activity using passive sonar.
In contrast, SSKs would struggle with this task, as they are required to surface
periodically; even with AIP technology, the ROK’s most advanced submarines
can transit for only two weeks or so without snorkeling. If a DPRK SSB were to
deploy, the ROK SSN also could tail and monitor the SSB indefinitely, with or
without the assistance of allied destroyers and U.S. P-3 Orion aircraft.
Just as importantly, in the event of a conflict ROK SSNs could eliminate preemptively the threat that DPRK SLBMs posed. As highlighted in table 5, SSNs’
superior speed would give them an edge over the ROK’s current SSKs in finding and eliminating the DPRK’s SSBs at sea before they could surface to deploy
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol73/iss1/6
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TABLE 5
THE ADVANTAGES OF NUCLEAR PROPULSION FOR ASW
ROK Jangbogo III Class

USN Virginia Class

Propulsion

Diesel-electric with AIP

Nuclear: S9G reactor

Endurance

2 weeks

Unlimited

20 kt

35 kt

Platform

Top speed (submerged)

Notes: AIP = air-independent propulsion; kt = knots; ROK = Republic of Korea.
Sources: “U.S. Navy Fact File: Virginia Class Submarine,” www.navy.mil/; “South Korea to Order 5 More U-214 AIP Submarines to Bridge to Indigenous
Boats,” Defense Industry Daily, 8 May 2015, www.defenseindustrydaily.com/.

SLBMs—“killing the arrow.” Alternatively, if the SSNs were equipped with verticallaunch systems and cruise missiles, they could target DPRK ports directly before
DPRK submarines put to sea—“killing the archer.”66
SSNs would amplify the ROK’s ASW capabilities significantly and thereby
reduce the DPRK’s incentives to continue pursuing an SLBM capability or to
deploy any SSBs that it develops.67 If North Korea appreciates that SSBs will be
unable to provide it a secure second-strike capability, given the allies’ ability to
destroy this capability preemptively, it may be less willing to bear the significant
cost of further developing this challenging technology. Furthermore, if North
Korea understands that any SSB it does develop is likely to be tracked and could
be eliminated if it puts to sea, it may be less likely to deploy these assets. If South
Korea can deny North Korea the ability to use its SSBs, North Korea also will be
less emboldened by any SLBM capability it acquires. Without the secure secondstrike capability offered by an SSB, North Korea will find it riskier to engage in
“salami-slicing tactics” or other steps short of war designed to undermine allied
security.68
Finally, ROK SSNs could be particularly useful as a tool for gunboat diplomacy. Gunboat diplomacy refers to states’ deployment and maneuvering of naval assets to signal capabilities and resolve to an adversary during a dispute. SSNs, able
to move stealthily and remain concealed for extended periods, can be surfaced
in sensitive areas as implicit threats.69 This gunboat diplomacy would highlight
the ROK’s ability to strike key DPRK maritime capabilities, serving as a useful
reminder of the costs of conflict with the allies.
States frequently have relied on naval capabilities to bolster coercive diplomacy. President Ronald W. Reagan used a major naval buildup coupled with
the publicly released 1986 Maritime Strategy (work on this began in 1982 with a
classified briefing) to signal U.S. resolve to resist Soviet revisionism and maintain maritime supremacy.70 As one of the strategy’s key architects, Secretary of
the Navy John Lehman, argued, “a key element of the 1982 Strategy was signaling America’s renewed commitment to naval power to both our adversaries
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and allies.”71 The Maritime Strategy also bolstered deterrence by denial through
strengthening naval war-fighting capabilities, allowing the United States to deny
to the Soviets the ability to interdict U.S. supply lines to Europe. Furthermore, it
augmented U.S. ability to hold Soviet SSBNs at risk, raising the cost to the Soviet
Union should it engage in conventional escalation in Europe.72
British military operations around the Falkland Islands provide particularly useful insights into the utility of SSNs for deterrence. In 1977, Operation
JOURNEYMAN saw British SSNs deployed to the waters surrounding the contested
islands successfully deter Argentine encroachment.73 Again, in 1982, during
the Falklands War, the presence of several British SSNs helped deter Argentina
from operating in the British-delineated military exclusion zone. Furthermore,
after a U.K. SSN, HMS Conqueror, sank an Argentine light cruiser, ARA General
Belgrano, the entire Argentine navy remained consigned to port, unable to put
to sea for fear of being destroyed by British SSNs. Subsequently, Britain was able
to secure control of the sea and cut off Argentine ground forces on the Falklands
from sea supply.74
Russia’s frequent use of SSNs for gunboat diplomacy during the Cold War
similarly highlights the platform’s usefulness for coercive signaling. As Brent
Ditzler argues in a 1989 thesis, “In what has become a standard pattern, a portion of the Soviet submarines involved in exercises and other diplomatic shows of
force, routinely surface for prolonged periods and/or subsequently make highly
visible port calls to friendly nations in the vicinity. This exposure is tactically
unnecessary, and can therefore be assumed to have some diplomatic meaning.”75
Reinforcing this argument, a retired Russian admiral argues that during the
1971 Indo-Pakistani War, the Soviet navy used SSNs for the express purpose of
gunboat diplomacy: “The Chief Commander’s order was that our submarines
should surface when the Americans appear. It was done to demonstrate to them
that we had nuclear submarines in the Indian Ocean. So when our subs surfaced,
they recognized us. In the way of the American Navy stood the Soviet cruisers,
destroyers, and atomic submarines equipped with anti-ship missiles.”76
Allied Blue-Water Collaboration
SSNs also would offer South Korea the ability to bolster its emerging bluewater naval capabilities, strengthening the U.S.-ROK alliance’s global maritime
potential. Presently, South Korea is limited largely to green-water capabilities;
it prioritizes the defense of Korean littoral waters rather than operations on
the high seas or in foreign littoral waters.77 Its primary existing blue-water
assets are the advanced Chungmugong Yi Sun-shin (KDX-II) and Sejong the
Great–class (KDX-III) destroyers, as well as the Dokdo-class amphibious assault ship, which was designed as the centerpiece of a future rapid-response
fleet.78 Currently, the underwater support for Dokdo and the KDX destroyers
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is limited to the Son Won-il– and Jangbogo III–class SSKs, which would limit
the range and speed of the rapid-response fleet.79 As highlighted by table 6, an
SSN could provide better support for this blue-water fleet, allowing it to move
faster and farther from friendly ports. Just as importantly, the SSN fleet could
operate independently in blue-water environments, given SSNs’ speed and virtually unlimited range and endurance. Overall, an ROK SSN program would
constitute a key step toward a more effective rapid-response fleet and a stronger
blue-water capability.
The greater blue-water capabilities conferred by an ROK SSN fleet could allow
the U.S.-ROK alliance to contribute more actively to regional and global security
beyond the Korean Peninsula. South Korea could employ these assets to assist the
United States in patrolling and protecting SLOCs throughout the Indo-Pacific.
Indeed, South Korea already has demonstrated its interest in assuming a broader
role in global sea-lane security alongside the United States, contributing forces
to protecting shipping lanes against piracy in the distant Gulf of Aden.80 South
Korea also could use its strengthened blue-water capabilities to track and interdict illegal shipments bound for North Korea, in line with the Proliferation
Security Initiative. Furthermore, rapid-response fleets escorted by SSNs could
contribute more quickly and effectively to peacekeeping, humanitarian, and
counterpiracy operations abroad. ROK SSNs also could support USN operations
throughout the Indo-Pacific by escorting and assisting carrier strike groups.81
These contributions would serve to strengthen the allies’ expanding “global
partnership.”82 As Presidents Moon and Trump highlighted in their joint statement in June 2017, “United States–ROK cooperation on global issues is an indispensable and expanding aspect of the Alliance.”83 A U.S.-ROK partnership with a
greater blue-water capability and focus would represent a significant step toward
the collaborative approach to maintaining global maritime security envisioned
by A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower, first published in 2007,
updated in 2015. The USN strategy emphasizes “the potential for a global network of navies that brings together the contributions of like-minded nations and
organizations around the world to address mutual maritime security challenges
and respond to natural disasters.”84 To help move toward this network, the strategy document states that the United States will “support our allies and partners
through training, exercises, and the provision of capabilities, via foreign military
sales and financing, to increase their capacity to address maritime security challenges.” The rationale behind the Cooperative Strategy’s “global network,” which
builds on the “1,000-ship navy” coalition concept advocated by Admiral Mike
Mullen, USN (Ret.), is sound.85 The United States needs stronger partnerships
with more-capable regional navies to help defend against the emerging threats
to the maritime commons. The PRC’s growing assertiveness throughout the
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TABLE 6
THE ADVANTAGES OF NUCLEAR PROPULSION FOR POWER PROJECTION
ROK Son Won-il Class

USN Virginia Class

Diesel-electric with AIP

Nuclear: S9G reactor

20 kt

35 kt

Range (submerged)

420 nm at 8 kt

Unlimited

Top speed (surfaced)

12 kt

25 kt

12,000 nm at 6 kt

Unlimited

Boat
Propulsion
Top speed (submerged)

Range (surfaced)

Notes: AIP = air-independent propulsion; kt = knots; nm = nautical miles; ROK = Republic of Korea.
Sources: Richard Tomkins, “New GenDyn Submarine Completes Alpha Trials,” UPI Press, 7 August 2014, www.upi.com/; “South Korea to Order 5 More
U-214 AIP Submarines to Bridge to Indigenous Boats.”

Indo-Pacific maritime commons is of particular concern. Friendly navies willing
to assume greater responsibility and acquire more-robust capabilities are a welcome prospect; while the United States will continue to bear much of the burden
for maritime security throughout the world, it cannot carry the load alone.86
South Korea is uniquely well positioned to form a key part of this partnership in
the Indo-Pacific, strengthening and broadening the U.S.-ROK alliance.
The role of SSNs in enhancing a maritime power’s blue-water and powerprojection capabilities is recognized widely. The Soviet Union relied on SSNs as
the basis for its blue-water fleet, rather than a large surface fleet or naval aviation.87 Brazil’s fledgling SSN program is viewed similarly as the centerpiece of a
new blue-water navy.88 The United States also regularly uses SSNs as part of its
forward-deployed naval presence—both independently and as support for its
carrier battle groups—far from its shores.
U.S.-U.K. cooperation on the U.K. SSN program in the 1950s helped the United Kingdom assume a bigger role in allied blue-water operations to counter the
Soviet Union at sea. The United Kingdom was able to contribute more to allied
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance on the Soviet navy farther from
U.K. shores because of the added endurance and sensor capabilities of its SSNs.
As Anthony Wells highlights, the two countries used their advanced capabilities
to great effect: “[T]he United States and United Kingdom together built a data
base on every Soviet submarine class and every hull within each class. . . . Speed,
depth, operating characteristics, and crew performance could all be observed
and recorded. . . . The superior stealth of well-handled U.S. and U.K. submarines
permitted penetration of the most sensitive and dangerous areas to observe and
record weapons trials.”89 The U.K.’s SSNs not only strengthened the country’s
contribution to its own defense; they also contributed directly to the defense of
the United States by guarding the Iceland-Greenland gap.90 Similarly, the United
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Kingdom was able to use its SSNs to project power across the Atlantic Ocean
during the Falklands War.
Overall, an ROK SSN program presents a host of potential benefits and risks for
the U.S.-ROK alliance. As this article argues, such an SSN program could undercut Sino-allied and ROK-Japan relations, lead to fears about ROK latent nuclear
capabilities, and incur sizable opportunity costs. These costs merit serious consideration. Nonetheless, the United States would stand to gain significantly by
assisting its ally in acquiring this capability. Such a policy would strengthen the
U.S.-ROK alliance’s cohesion, coercive bargaining position, and blue-water capabilities. Playing an active role in the development of the ROK’s SSN program also
would give the United States more leverage over the way in which this capability
is developed, helping it better offset some of the program’s risks.
The underlying question—whether South Korea itself should pursue this
program—is still up for debate. There is little doubt that such a project would be
a truly herculean undertaking. Its advisability depends on the ROK’s strategic vision for itself. If South Korea is content with securing only its immediate territory
using a powerful land force and a green-water navy well suited for littoral operations, then an SSN fleet may be superfluous. If, however, South Korea wishes to
become a blue-water power, capable of projecting power and contributing to the
security of far-flung SLOCs, SSNs may be indispensable.
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